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Public administration as an art is defined in the Ghanaian context regarding decentralization and public 
officials’ accountability.  It examines decentralization, local elections and empowerment. While the 
paper advocates for regional and district level elections, it uses the literature to argue that local 
representatives are more accessible to their locals. It questions the current appointment practices by 
the central government, which has become more partisan than originally intended in the Local 
Government Act.  To affirm the democratic environment of politics in Ghana, it calls for constitutional 
amendment regarding decentralization and local government elections.   
 





As the first sub-Saharan African country to attain political 
independence since 1957 from Great Britain, the 
Ghanaian proclivity for experimentation on issues 
including social, economic and political initiatives, 
according to Pellow and Chazan (1986) and Ayee (2008), 
has turned the country “into a veritable laboratory for the 
investigation of different approaches to endemic African 
problems” (Pellow and Chazan, 1986: 210). One of these 
problems is local participation in political decision making 
in the country’s democratic process (Antwi-Boasiako and 
Bonna, 2009).  
Local accountability becomes effective where local 
leaders are elected by their own people hence the 
importance of decentralization. “Ghana’s decentralization 
policy from 1988 to date combines elements of political, 
administrative and fiscal decentralization,” among other 
things that seek to promote effective governance at the 
local level (Ayee, 2008: 234).    
This paper provides an overview of theoretical 
considerations and ambiguity underlying the argument for 
decentralization followed by a brief history of Ghana’s 
political system. It then addresses the issues of effective 
public administrators (leaders) and decentralization. It 
concludes by making a case for local government 
elections in the various electoral constituencies: districts 
and regions, while recommendations are made for 
constitutional amendments to allow locals to elect their 
own public officials. To understand the role of public 
officials in the Ghanaian political environment, an attempt 
is made here to define public administration. 
 
 
DEFINING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN GHANA 
 
The Ghanaian political heads of state, from the first pre-
sident, Kwame Nkrumah (1957) to John Evans Atta-Mills 
(2009) have different leadership skills that affirm the 
diverse administrative styles of public administrators. This 
non-surprisingly diverse nature in public administration is 
normative in its definition focusing mainly on public 
interest (King and Chilton, 2009). Each one of the 
leaders, including those not mentioned in this paper, has 
had his fair share of public criticisms of maladministration 
given their administrative styles, yet all of them are more 
likely to vow that their actions were in the interest of the 
public. Ghana, a country of only 54 years of political 
freedom, gaining political independence from the British 
colonial rule, has had four different constitutions; 
however, 21 out of the 54 years of the country was ruled 
under military decrees
1
 leaving only 33 years of 
constitutional administration in Ghana.       
The literature on public administration and its definition 
has different interpretations of  the  field  (Stillman,  2010;  
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 The first military administration in Ghana was from 1966-1969, second 







King and Chilton, 2009). Public administrators are 
engaged in technicalities but unfortunately, some 
Ghanaians, if not most of them, lack the knowledge to 
fully comprehend the role of public administrators. More-
over, Ghanaians are not alone as “empirical descriptions 
from an external perspective,” studies have shown that 
“no one really sees the big picture” in its definition (King 
and Chilton, 2009: 29, 1). One can therefore argue that a 
lot of the citizens do not understand the details of the 
legal duties of their leaders operations. In addition to 
budgetary preparations and job classifications, public 
administrators are equally concerned with the develop-
ment of human resources and achieving the goals of the 
people.  
Public administration, like any other academic 
discipline, is not isolated but intertwined “with the critical 
dilemmas confronting an entire society”. Its diverse 
nature makes it difficult for ordinary Ghanaians who are 
not part of an administration to focus on the goals of that 
administration if those goals are not clearly defined.  
Many studies including, but not limited to, King and 
Chilton (2009), Grover Starling (2001), McSuite (2002), 
William (1995), Robert (1995) and James and Donald 
(1996), for decades have offered different definitions of 
public administration (Stillman, 2010: 2 - 4). Cropf (2008: 
8), citing Dwight Waldo, also agrees “no single, and 
authoritative definition of public administration is 
possible”.  
For example, Grover (1998: 10) stated that public 
administration is the process by which resources are 
marshaled and then used to cope with the problems 
facing a political community, but David (1986: 6) sees it 
as “the use of managerial, political and legal theories and 
processes to fulfill legislative, executive and judicial 
governmental mandates for the provision of regulatory 
and service functions for the society as a whole or for 
some segments of it”.  
Leonard (1955: 3), considered as one of the pioneers in 
the field, has a broader definition. He defines it as “con-
sisting of all those operations having for their purpose the 
fulfillment or enforcement of public policy”. Given the 
complexities of leadership and public administration in 
Ghana, it becomes more confusing if the administration 
of local communities is laid only on the shoulders of the 
central government. The logical definition of public 
administration, the author argues, is derived from 
differing understanding of sagacity or different premises. 
To the Ghanaians, despite how ill-defined the field is, 
public administration must be seen in the areas including 
transparency, accountability and decentralization.   
Public administration should be a collective effort to 
manage the human resources for effective implemen-
tation of public policies within the budgetary constraints of 
that community. It is, therefore, important that public 
administrators are elected to serve the people within a 
given community.  
Drawing from the literature, public administration is the 
management   of   the  scarce  resources,  that  is,  financial, 




human and material of a community by elected and 
unelected public officials to benefit the said community, 
region or district. Public administration is an art, which 
strategically combines these resources to maximize their 
utilization in the interest of the citizens within a governed 
jurisdiction. Contrary to the scientific
2
 argument for public 
administration, the field, some have argued, only 
provides a focus and not a locus (Henry, 1975). For 
public administrators to be seen as effective and 
productive, their area of administration must be politically 
and clearly defined hence the importance of 
decentralization.        
One of the essential components of democratic 
societies, which has being adopted in emerging demo-
cracies is decentralization to make their administrative 
systems more efficient (Dillinger, 1994). In Ghana, as 
Ayee (2008: 233) noted, since independence, succeeding 
governments in Ghana have preoccupied themselves 
with decentralization because they regarded it as a 
necessary condition for not only the socio-economic 
development of the country, but also as a way of 
achieving their political objectives such as the 
recentralization of power and legitimacy”.    
The large body of scholarly literature on decentrali-
zation provides conflicting analyses on effective public 
administration (Faguet, 2008; Kim et al., 2005). In Ghana, 
politicians who advocate for decentralization are 
sometimes skeptical of giving or sharing power with their 
subordinates as the concept is either not well defined or 
understood in the Ghanaian context.  
As Gyimah-Boadi
3
 observed that even though local 
governments are given autonomy over finance, control 
from the central government had taken away that power 
from the local people. He maintains that the districts do 
not have the capacity to manage their finance, and even 
the District Assembly Common Fund is controlled by the 
central government. Gyimah-Boadi noted that local 
government policy in Ghana had brought developments 
since its inception in 1988, but the situation was 
aggravated by the total hegemony exercised by the 
central government. 
In fact, the literature on decentralization, according to 
constitutional law specialists, tries to avoid the problem of 
confining decentralization to legal models of government 
relations (Cohen and Peterson, 1999: l, 19). The authors 
define it along the principal distinction between unitary 
and federal based systems like federation, confederation, 
unions and leagues.  Decentralization,  according  to  this 
                                               
2
 The author strongly argues that public administration is an art and not science. 
This argument is not the focus of the paper and hopes to discuss this 
extensively in another article but for now this argument is beyond the scope of 
this paper. To have an idea of the scientific argument for public administration 
see Nicholas Henry, 1975, Public Administration Review.  35 (4) 378-386.  
3
 Professor Gyimah-Boadi discussed the conflicting gains of decentralization at 
a symposium in 2009 in Ghana. See 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=16
2875 Retrieved on July 25, 2010.  He also noted the lack of smooth 
implementation of decentralization policies.    
 




school of thought, is a community having legally specified 
sovereignty over the identified public sector tasks in a 
well-defined territorial jurisdiction (Cohen and Peterson, 
1999: 19 - 22).  
Ghana’s political structure falls into the unitary political 
category, where the executive holds the power of 
nominating district and regional leaders. Hence, the 
governed in these units have no choice but to live with 
the selection of the executive. The practice of public 
administration comes in many shades as the literature 
struggles to identify a universal acceptable definition.   
Since the Fourth Republic of Ghana (1992 - present), 
despite the accusations of electoral frauds by the two 
leading political parties (New Patriotic Party [NPP] and 
National Democratic Congress [NDC]) in the country, 
Ghana, as a country, has enjoyed five successful general 
elections. This feat, undeniably, makes Ghana a more 
politically and economically stable country compared to 
some of its neighbors over the same period (Callmachi, 
2008). 
The irony of Ghana’s political system is that 
notwithstanding the form of government of the country 
(military or democratic), the role of the executive remains 
the same regarding the appointments of the heads of 
local governments. This practice, arguably, provides little 
or no local power to the grassroots. It therefore, 
minimizes the otherwise political difference between a 
military and democratic regime. 
This paper argues for a constitutional amendment to 
allow a stronger local government empowerment through 
local government elections. It maintains that by 
continuing the current process where regional and district 
administrators are appointed by the central government, 
the locals are deprived of the opportunity to elect leaders 
of their choice. For example, the original intent of 
decentralization and the appointment of local public 
officials have given way to intense partisan politics. 
Gyimah-Boadi
4
 recently admitted that the non-partisan 
concept of decentralization has “burbled with party 
politics”. He further explained that 30% of the government 
appointees to the District Assembly, according to the 
Local Government Act [of 1988], should be technocrats 
and experts, but surveys conducted by CDD-Ghana in 
2005 and 2007, revealed that most of the appointees 
were political activists. 
 Additionally, this argument “stems largely from the idea 
that decentralization will promote better governance as 
local officials are supposedly more aware of, and more 
responsive to, local needs” (Ducan, 2007: 713). Decen-
tralization, as has been argued by proponents, is more 
likely to encourage and promote not only democracy, but 
also provides locals  with   the   chance   to  have  control 
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 See an editorialized version of Professor Gyimah-Boadi’s speech on  
“Reflection on Ghana's Decentralisation Programme: Progress, Stagnation or 
Retrogression” retrieved from   
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=16





over their own governance. 
 
 
THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING AND AMBIGUITIES 
OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
It is often easier to document and discuss the 
shortcomings of decentralization, public administration 
and governance in Ghana than in theory. There is a 
complex notion of subalternity pertinent to any academic 
enterprise, which concerns itself with historically deter-
mined relationships (Ghadi, 1998: 2) of any one concept 
in abstraction and its implementation. The concept of 
decentralization and its interpretations have become a 
battleground for variety of disciplines and theories. 
However, scholars of public administration including 
political analysts often discuss theoretical shortcomings 
and lack of development with very little incorporation of 
the effect of that theory or model (7 - 22).  Dubin (1969: 
6) argues that developing a theory must have a human 
experience. He posits “the need for theories lies in the 
human behavior of wanting to impose order on unordered 
experiences, which is not ordered by nature hence the 
experiences may be…theorized about, in very different 
ways”.   
As a solution to ease regional conflicts (Laksono and 
Topatimasang, 2003; Permana, 2002), decentralization is 
a process where central government transfers political, 
fiscal and administrative powers to lower levels in an 
administrative and territorial hierarchy (Duncan, 2007: 
713). In theory, it holds regional leaders accountable to 
their constituents instead of the central government. 
Decentralization is defined in a variety of ways by the 
degree of delegation and autonomy of local actors 
(Assibey-Mensah, 2000; Fesler, 1965; Werlin, 2003), 
which presents conflicts and dilemmas in the concept and 
its impact (Faguet, 1997; Hommes, 1995). Empirical 
literature does not agree on the benefits of decen-
tralization as different studies are poles apart in their 
conclusions. For example, while Olowu and Wunsch 
(1990), Putnam (1993) and World Bank (1994) argue that 
decentralization makes governments more responsive, 
Faguet (2008), Tanzi (1995), Prud’homme (1995) and 
Samoff (1990) think otherwise. However, the 1992 con-
stitutional recognition for decentralization has renewed 
interest in political decentralization in Ghana, as locals 
often reject leaders appointed by the central government 
(Ayisi, 2008). 
While economists focus on efficiency and equity, public 
administration scholars are also interested in the 
distribution of power, responsiveness, transparency, and 
accountability (Klingner and Nalbandian, 1998). The 
literature affirms that macroeconomic function must 
remain with the central government, suggesting that local 
governments must deal with program specificities for 
local demand. Oates (1993) analysis of over 50 countries 
confirmed a positive relationship between decentrali-






The theoretical argument for fiscal decentralization 





 centuries (Wolman, 1990), though they had different 
reasons for supporting decentralization. For example, in 
the Federalist Papers No. 39 (FP39), Madison argues 
that leaders must derive their powers “directly… from the 
great body of the people,” which means that powerful 
locals and “not inconsiderable…handful of …nobles are 
exercising their oppression by a delegation of their 
powers” (Rossiter, 1961: 241). Though decentralization is 
not specifically mentioned in FP39, Madison believes that 
the people must be given the mandate to elect their 
leaders as a way of “composing the distinct and 
independent regions, to which they respectively belong” 
(Rossiter, 1961: 243). 
Rousseau (176: 59 - 50) also favored small govern-
ment. To him, “rulers overburdened with business, see 
nothing for themselves: clerks govern” (1762,). Using the 
Poland political system, Rousseau, who advocated for a 
political reformation, instructed the poles to perfect and 
extend the authority of their provincial parliaments to 
avoid the dangers of larger state bureaucracies 
(Rousseau, 1772: 183-184). By this assertion, Rousseau 
was insisting on the essentials of local repre-sentation 
(decentralization). According to Wolman (1990), small 
democratic (local) governments were the funda-mental 
hopes of the people, as most of them distrusted the 
activities of the central government. The debate for 
political decentralization is inconclusive in the literature 
as both proponents and opponents provide different 
findings in their studies (for example, Putnam, 1993; 
Prud’homme, 1995). 
In discussing the politics of decentralization, therefore, 
it should be noted that the concept goes together with 
centralized government power. Though decentralization 
is primarily a strategy for transferring authority and 
responsibility from the central government to sub-national 
(regional and district) levels of government (Ostrom, 
1989; Stone, 1997), many African leaders only adopt the 
concept in theory but fail to delegate powers to the 
districts and regions. Some studies maintain that the 
concept is not easily defined; therefore, it has several 
dimensions and wide variety types of institutional 
restructuring, which encompasses the term decentrali-
zation. Though some scholars see it as a simple term, 
they argue that its simplistic generalization is sometimes 
too broad.  According to Fesler (1965:536), decentrali-
zation is a term of rich conceptual and empirical meaning, 
“which can designate static fact and dynamic process 
and it can refer to pure ideal-type and moderate 
incremental change” when the rational theory of 
decentralization is understood in all compartments. 
 
 
DECENTRALIZATION: POLITICAL, DEVOLUTION 
AND DELEGATION 
 
For the purpose of this paper, a brief three-stage (political  




decentralization, devolution and delegation) definition of 
decentralization is provided based on the degree of 
discretion and responsibility delegated by the central 
executive. The literature shows that developing countries 
have addressed decentralization in different ways, often 
reflecting the national history, politics and culture for 
administrative and economic efficiency; but more 
importantly is the role of district and regional leaders in 
focusing on the needs of their constituencies. However, 
the concept of the decentralization/development dicho-
tomy has not yielded the desired results in other parts of 
the world (Kettl, 2000), including Ghana. This analysis 
defines decentralization as an electoral devolution to 
enable citizens at the grassroots (that is, locals) to elect 






Political decentralization, which is manifested in the 
degree and types of political autonomy and accounta-
bility, is of greater importance to this study. A fully 
developed system of political decentralization in Ghana is 
a situation where local people in the districts and regions 
elect their own legislative and executive personnel so that 
those units will be able to hire, pay and dismiss 
administrative personnel without reference to central 
authority. 
Political decentralization gives citizens and their elected 
representatives the political power in the public policy 
process. This form of decentralization is associated with 
pluralistic politics and representative government, but it 
can also support democratization by giving citizens or 
their representatives, more influence in the formulation 
and implementation of policies (Furniss, 1974; Harrigan, 
1994) in their areas. Political decentralization often 
requires constitutional or statutory reforms. Such a reform 
may force elected officials in the constituencies to be 
more accountable to the electorates instead of satisfying 
the wishes of a distant executive. Administratively, 
political decentralization empowers citizens to “play a 
larger role in regional governance… [including] conflict 
resolution” (Duncan, 2007: 727). This empowerment, 
unfortunately, is lacking in the current political process 
where the executive has the exclusive power to appoint 
district and regional leaders. The literature affirms that 
political appointees are subject to the whims (Klingner 
and Nalbandian, 1998: 43) of the central government. 
Generally, empirical studies tend to favor political 
decentralization over centralization in terms of innovation, 
leadership accountability and responsiveness (Taylor, 
2003: 231). This assertion, according to Taylor, has 
become a sort of accepted wisdom among social 
scientists. Nevertheless, given the theoretical support by 
social scientists, a general correlation between political 
decentralization and innovation is yet to be firmly 
established. Treisman (2007) argues  that  self-governing  
 




is the core aspect of modern democratic nations where 
the people must elect their own leaders. To Treisman, 
political decentralization is good for its facilitating 
features. These features include, but are not limited to, 
administrative efficiency, checks on central government 
abuses and policy experimentation. While decentrali-
zation satisfies geographically concentrated ethnic 
groups, it could also prompt locally elected officials to be 
unsupportive to the central government by “playing the 
ethnic card” to distort fiscal distribution. Political 





Deconcentration is a form of network of central power 
and sub-state institutions comprising the elites of those 
constituencies. As Assibey (2000) puts it, deconcentra-
tion is a power sharing strategy where power is trans-
ferred from central operating agencies to regional ones. 
The central government under such a concept uses the 
local governments to improve efficiency and effective-
ness of delivering services (Cheema and Rondinelli, 
1983: 79 - 81).  Rondinelli (1981) argues that deconcen-
tration takes place as long as the central government 
disperses certain responsibilities of services to the 





The final form of decentralization discussed in this paper 
is delegation, which seeks to transfer services and 
responsibilities from central government agencies to 
specialized organizations with some degree of operating 
autonomy (Ayee, 2000). Apart from devolution, which is 
expected to stand on its own, the other forms of 
decentralization that have already been discussed tend to 
overlap in the execution of responsibilities between the 
centralized authority and district or regional represent-
tatives. The theory of decentralization obviously presents 
a problem for a country with a unitary political system like 
Ghana because of the system’s political and legal 
structures. 
The NPP under John Agyekum Kufour’s presidency, 
like its predecessor, Jerry J. Rawlings, promoted the 
decentralization concept as one of its administrative 
goals, but how an administration would choose one 
strategy over another remains a matter of preference and 
interest of that administration. Though the Ghana 
Constitution provides the structure of decentralization in 
Ghana (Ghana Constitution: Chapter 20: Article 240, A – 
E), it does not allow citizens at the grassroots to elect 
their political leaders. For example, Article 243 [1] states 
that regional and district political leaders shall be 
appointed by the President. Undeniably, democratic 





reforms in Ghana. One could argue that decentralization 
has not succeeded since it does not appear to adopt the 
characteristics discussed in the literature.  The concept of 
political decentralization in Ghana has negative impli-
cations to the executive since some districts have over 
the years resisted the appointments and nominations of 
their leaders by the central authority (Ayisi, 2008). 
 
 
DECENTRALIZATION IN GHANA: A BRIEF 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A discussion of the complexities facing Ghana’s political 
leadership including the Kufour and Mills administrations 
regarding decentralization is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, some understanding of the concept from 
a historical background may help to explain the quandary 
of the executive. The literature on this topic considers the 
colonial British indirect rule through the local chiefs as the 
genesis of decentralization in the then Gold Coast (now 
Ghana). Decentralization thus became a political tool for 
the British through the chiefs and their elders to reinforce 
the wishes of the British government (Antwi-Boasiako 
and Bonna, 2009). As Bamfo (2000) and Rathbone 
(2000) noted, those chiefs who cooperated with the 
British were rewarded and the uncooperative ones were 
punished. Such an authoritative implementation of the 
concept created fear among the chiefs and their subjects 
(that is, the locals). 
Ghana’s political independence in March, 1957 did little 
to change the political structures established by the 
colonizers. As a result, many studies have described 
post-colonial decentralization as ineffective, in which 
regime change through military coups became the order 
of the day after Kwame Nkrumah was ousted in 1966. It 
was during the mid-1970s under Lt. Col. Ignatius Kutu 
Acheampong’s military regime that the government tried 
to empower the locals (Nkrumah, 2000). The history of 
contemporary decentralization in spite of Acheampong’s 
attempt is credited to the Provisional National Defense 
Council (PNDC) regime under Jerry John Rawlings’ 
administration (Assibey-Mensah, 2000). Assibey-Mensah 
(2000: 17) argues that after the passage of the 1987 
Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207), 110 District 
Councils and their respective District Assemblies (DAs) 
were set up to ensure local participation in the decision 
making process. This led to the formation of the defunct 
People’s Defense Committees (PDCs) in communities to 
identify each area’s needs instead of relying on the 
central government to make every decision and try to 
solve local problems from the ‘castle’ (Office of the 
National Government). Research shows that the PDC 
concept created grassroots interest in local administration 
as district elections during the PNDC regime were the 
highest ever recorded for the decades in the late 1980s. 
Assibey-Mensah (2000: 17) also noted that official 






voters cast their ballots in the local elections, and the 
turnout was the highest of any district-level election over 
the past 30 years.  
The PDCs, made up of local self-identified defenders of 
the PNDC revolution, effectively took over local govern-
ment responsibilities, though they were often limited to 
mobilizing the implementation of local self-help projects, 
while the deconcentrated ministries played a more 
significant role. Ayee (1994) notes that despite the 
PNDC’s rhetoric, its interest in decentralization reflected 
in that of previous regimes, thus, a curiosity in the 
administrative decentralization of central government and 
not the devolution of political authority to the local level.  
Additionally, Ayee (2000: 49 - 50) perceives a key feature 
of local governance, through the PDCs for example, in 
the pre-1988 period as a dual hierarchical structure in 
which central and local government institutions operated 
in parallel, but with encroachment at times by better-
resourced central government on the roles and respon-
sibilities of under-resourced local revolutionary activists. 
The PDC concept of decentralization became a legitimate 
revolutionary political institution under the PNDC military 
administration. Since some studies have argued that 
local participation ensures more direct form of democracy 
in which the voices of ordinary people can be heard more 
easily, the PNDC used the PDCs and Workers Defense 
Committees (WDCs) to make decisions in the local 
communities and workplaces. These institutions, PDCs 
and WDCs, were to take part in the decision making pro-
cess at the grassroots in the rural areas and workplaces 
in urban areas, respectively. Given the theoretical 
understanding of decentralization, it was believed that 
these groups would unlock the virtue and intelligence of 
the populace at the grassroots level and would foster 
good government and promote social capital (Debrah, 
2009: 281).  
 
 
Understanding the politics of decentralization from 
the PNDC era 
 
The military administration of Rawlings planned to trans-
fer both fiscal and some political responsibilities from 
Accra (National Capital of Ghana) to all the districts and 
municipalities in the country. This move centered on 
Local Government Law decreed under the PNDC 
administration and was aimed to introduce fiscal balance 
between the central government and the districts. By 
transferring power to the districts, the PNDC admini-
stration was making government more responsive to local 
communities to placate critics of the centralized military 
rule. For example, according to Adedeji (200: 1), 
Ghanaians were not happy with Rawlings’ PNDC admini-
stration during the late 1980s. He stated “objections to 
the authoritarianism of Rawlings government, which 
lacked structure for grassroots participation, were wide-
spread despite rhetoric to the contrary by the PNDC”.  
The PNDC government introduced a legislative  reform,  




the Local Government Law (LGL) (PNDC Law 207) in 
1988, which led to the creation of 110 designated districts 
within Ghana’s ten regions, with non-partisan District 
Assembly (DA) elections held for the first time in 1988/89 
under the PNDC, and subsequently every four years 
(1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). The law provides in part 
that two-thirds of the DA members are elected on an 
individual non-partisan basis and one-third is appointed 
by the central government including a ‘district chief 
executive’ (DCE) for each of the 110 districts. 
The 1988 LGL was to promote grassroots, citizen parti-
cipation and ownership of the machinery of government 
by devolving power, competence and means power at 
the district level. The PNDC decentralization exercise, 
through the PDCs, was to satisfy the demands of the 
revolution and was not in the interest of democratic 
principles. Ayee (2000) argues that the decentralization 
policy under the second Rawlings regime had self-
serving motives. The PNDC’s decentralization policy is 
therefore seen by critics as an effort to increase the 
legitimacy of Rawlings’ second revolution, which ruled 
Ghana from 1982 through 1992. 
 
 
The dance: Constitution and decentralization 
 
Following over a decade of military dictatorship under J. 
J. Rawlings (1981 -1991), the 1992 Ghana Constitution 
provided a transition from a military rule to multi-party 
democracy at the national level, which also authorized 
the 1988 LGL reforms. It consolidated the aim of 
decentralization within the overall context of a liberal 
democratic constitution, yet essential democratic 
elements remained compromised, especially through the 
retention of presidential appointments instead of local 
elections in the districts. The objective of decentralization 
was laid out specifically in the 1992 Ghana Constitution 
(chapter 20) under decentralization and local govern-
ment. Here, the ‘constitution’ states categorically in 
Article 240 1 “local government and administration [are 
to] be decentralized, and that the functions, powers, 
responsibilities and resources should be transferred from 
the central government [Castle] to the local government” 
constituencies (Article 240 [2])”. 
The independent role of the local government, with 
discretionary powers at the grassroots, was subjected to 
a provision in Article 240 [2b], which states that measures 
should be taken to enhance the capacity of local govern-
ment authorities to plan, initiate, co-ordinate, manage and 
execute policies in respect of matters affecting local 
people. 
The principles of participation in local government and 
accountability to the locals were also emphasized in 
Article 240 [2e], which states that to ensure the accounta-
bility of local government authorities, people in particular 
local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be 
afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their 
governance. There is a contradiction here. For example, 
during the eras of Rawlings and Kufour’s administrations,  
 




the locals rejected their leaders, but the executive 
rejected the cry of citizens at the grassroots (locals) 
(Ghana News Agency, 2005). 
It is not uncommon for the central government to 
appoint someone the people have rejected in parlia-
mentary elections to become the senior administrator in 
the same constituency. In 2005, several of such 
appointments were made and the trend did not change. 
Critics argue that in the first place, [such practice] 
amounts to undermining democracy, because these were 
the people who were rejected by their own constituents at 
an election and the government is recycling them by 
using the 'back door' to now impose them on the people 
as their political heads  (Ghana News Agency, 2005b).  
Without a doubt, the democratic intent in the decen-
tralization requirements is provided in Article 35[6d]: The 
state shall take appropriate measures by decentralizing 
the administrative and financial machinery of government 
to the regions and districts and by affording all possible 
opportunities to the people to participate in decision-
making at every level of national life and in government. 
The 1992 Ghana Constitution preserved some of the 
PNDC 1988 reforms of non-partisan local level elections 
and presidential powers of appointment. A District 
Assembly shall comprise 70% elected members and 30% 
of the members appointed by the President in 
consultation with traditional authorities and other interest 
groups in the district (Article 242[d]). For example, the 
appointment of a ‘district chief executive’ (DCE) by the 
President is retained with at least the approval of 66% of 
the DA members (Article 243[1]). The DCE is the political 
head of the local executive, centrally involved in decision-
making, with a ‘district coordinating director’ (DCD) as the 
highest ranking civil servant. Additionally, after the 
elections, the assemblies, once in session, will become 
the highest political authorities in the districts (Owusu-
Ansah, 1989: 215)  
The Ghana Constitution also provides guidelines for the 
local government on finances and clearly states that the 
DAs should have sound financial bases with adequate 
and reliable sources of revenue [Article 240(2)], with an 
attempt to secure this position through the establishment 
of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). This is 
determined annually by the legislature but with appro-
priation “not less than 5% of the total revenues of Ghana” 
[Article 252(2)].  The proceeds of the DACF are divided 
between DAs on the basis of a revenue sharing formula 
approved by the legislative. Article 240 provides reforms 
of the civil service with local government authority, which 
states that, as far as practicable, the persons in the 
service of the local government shall be subjected to 
effective control of the local authorities [2][d]). The irony 
of Article 240 is that it is focused extensively on the 
districts with no mention of the responsibilities of regional 
leaders. For Ghana, to benefit from the decentralization 
concept, it would largely depend on the vision of the 








DECENTRALIZATION: ONE CONCEPT WITH MANY 
INTERPRETATIONS 
 
Ghana’s political history since independence lacks 
administrative continuity. The road to Ghana’s indepen-
dence was brutal and nasty as the British did not want to 
relinquish its power over the occupied colonies. The 
military and democratic mix of Ghana’s political system 
since independence has given leaders a cause to be 
cautious of how they share power at the regional and 
district levels.  
Since the military ousted the Convention People’s Party 
(CPP) under Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in 1966, 
democratically elected leaders like Dr. K. A. Busia (1969 - 
1972), Dr. Hilla Liman (1979 - 1981), Jerry J. Rawlings 
(1992 - 2000) and John A. Kufour (2001 - 2008) have 
always been suspicious of individuals who could 
influence the military in coup plots. Busia and Liman 
became victims of military coups, while the Kufour 
administration accused some individuals of plotting to 
overthrow his administration. For example, several media 
reports quoted President Kufour as saying “ex-President 
Rawlings was planning a coup to topple his government” 
(Enquirer, 2006).  
How does this play into decentralization? Given the 
above discussion, leaders tend to delegate respon-
sibilities and government duties to individuals who are 
loyal to a ruling party instead of allowing the grassroots to 
elect their own leaders to ensure security. It could be 
argued that such appointments do not consider the 
interest of the citizens, who oftentimes reject the 
presidential appointees. 
On four different occasions (1966, 1972, 1979 and 
1981), the Ghana Constitution was suspended as a result 
of military coups. It can be argued that such political 
instability has forced democratic leaders to act like 
military leaders where the executive tends to hold on to 
power, while the regional leaders become extensions of 
the executive branch without any significant power. 
Democratic and undemocratic changes of government in 
Ghana affect local political structures.  For example, the 
fall of the Nkrumah’s CPP saw the collapse of the ‘young 
pioneers’ (youth wings of the CPP), while the PDCs 
vanished with the defunct PNDC as a grassroot political 
structure.  
Ghana’s political history shows that decentralization is 
a concept used by governments to reflect the leaders’ 
political ideologies as seen under the Nkrumah, Rawlings 
and Kufour administrations, but the actual implementation 
of the concept under any of these leaders is far from how 
the literature defines it. Politically, whether civilian or 
military, the executive has always appointed favorites as 
political leaders in the regions and districts with little input 






LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY: MAKING A CASE FOR 
THE LOCAL ELECTIONS 
 
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) argue that local involvement in 
the political process through elections ensures self-
empowerment as locals gain more political power.  Such 
empowerment translates to locals not only trusting their 
elected officials but also have a higher sense of political 
efficacy about local citizens’ issues (382 -384). Despite 
the mixed conclusions of the impact of decentralization in 
the literature, as the concept has both “political and 
technical tradeoffs” (Ayee, 2005: 255), Ghana is on 
record as chalking some progress in implementing 
decentralization. Therefore, allowing locals to elect their 
own leaders or public officials makes government more 
accountable to the local populations (Duncan, 2007:711) 
and more responsive to local concerns. As Debrah 
(2009) and Gregory (2007) noted, an analysis of Western 
political philosophical ideology affirms and underpins the 
centrality of local accountability in democratic political 
systems. This western political philosophy, in part, was in 
line with Owusu-Ansah’s argument that the local elected 
officials will become the highest political authorities in the 
districts where they would be responsible and held 
accountably for their actions. The author maintained that 
this was the ultimate goal of the PNDC administration 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1989: 215). Regional and district 
elections would ensure accountability, which is histori-
cally rooted in steward of public trust (Kearns, 1995: 7). 
To Kearns, accountability is not just a “formal process 
and channels for reporting to a higher authority but 
involves a wider spectrum of local expectations and 
performance standards that are used to judge the 
performance, responsiveness and even morality of the 
elected local officials”. It is against this background in the 
literature that this paper calls for districts and regional 
elections in Ghana. 
In any matured democracy, the people govern them-
selves or play a significant role in the governing process 
through elections. The theory of modern representative 
democratic systems provides that the core of popular 
participation is voting, therefore, an elected candidate will 
represent the voice of the governed.   
The gap created through legal and constitutional 
backing for not electing DCEs and RMs in Ghana has 
been highlighted in this paper. The actual challenge is on 
government (Parliament) to realize this loophole in the 
Ghanaian Constitution by legally and procedurally 
amending it for voters in the districts to elect individuals 
of their choice. A weak democratic constitution, one could 
argue, is better than the strongest authoritative decree 
since the former avails itself for amendments and not the 
latter. 
The 1992 Ghana Constitution came into being after 
over a decade of military rule. It could, therefore, be 
argued that the absence of honest and prolonged 
discussion in the writing of this ‘constitution’ before its 
adoption may have represented the views  of  a  few  who  




belong to the military class (or pro-PNDC
5
) with their 
authoritative ideology despite several years of constitu-
tional assembly meetings. As a result, 16 years into the 
Fourth Republic is considered young in the political 
literature. However, it seems to be the ripe time for any 
amendments if the ‘constitution’ would be able to stand 
the test of the years ahead as Ghana snails into a well 
established democracy. 
The government must devise new strategies for 
managing public programs as it critically evaluates 
policies regarding issues like health, education, the 
national economy, elections and transportation. With 
anticipated growth in the economy and other sectors, it is 
obvious that the central government may not be able to 
police every sector of the economy at large, especially in 
the regions; hence, the importance of decentralization as 
discussed earlier in this paper. Most government 
bureaucracies in Ghana remain structured and staffed to 
manage the traditional pre-independence political 
programs with the central government in control of every 
activity. 
As the country has undeniably accepted democracy as 
the way toward viable political and economic develop-
ment, government strategies and tactics must also 
change, especially in its structures and processes in the 
area of human resource management. Regrettably, such 
a centralized bureaucratic structure as the executive 
appointment of leaders in the regions and districts has 
not changed significantly in line with democratic 
principles. Although the district and regional leaders’ 
appointments by a president have constitutional backing, 
this paper advocates for a constitutional amendment to 
allow locals to elect their leaders instead of the central 
government. Admittedly, since the 1990s, Ghana has 
undergone a steady, but often unnoticed transformation 
in terms of its policies toward improved health care, 
education, transportation and economic growth. How-
ever, in all these sectors, a decentralized management 
system could have provided a better sense of local 
ownership, which would have led to an improved 
maintenance of facilities and government assets as long 
as transparency and accountability existed on the part of 
the elected. 
Local citizens’ direct involvement in electing their 
leaders is more likely to improve government efficiency 
and responsiveness, which are likely to ensure regional 
accountability where the citizens will have the mandate to 
replace or retain their leaders through elections based on 
the leaders’ performance during their tenure. The election 
of DA members and RMs could be scheduled the same 
date that the presidential and parliamentary election is 
held. Such a constitutional amendment  is  more  likely  to  
                                               
5
 Owusu-Ansah (1989) sets the tone of the PNDC and other preparations the 
then military government tried to move the country from military to civilian 
government. See Owusu-Ansah, David (1986). The Provisional National 
Defence Council of Ghana. A move toward consolidation.  International Third 
World Stud. J. Rev., (1): 213-218.  
 




diminish the notion of the indirect one party system where 
the president appoints DCEs and RMs throughout the 
country and those appointees are replaced as soon as 





Despite the comprehensive decentralization policy of the 
government since the late 1980s, Ghana is still buried in 
a highly centralized top-down public administrative 
political system (Ayee, 2008). The little gains made in the 
area of decentralization seem to be eroding as partisan 
politics take precedence over democratic principles and 
local interest. The complexity of public management calls 
for the cooperative effort of all the individuals who make 
up an administration. The actions and decisions are so 
complex with multiple possibilities and changes that it 
becomes practically impossible to identify a universally 
acceptable definition for public administration (Stillman, 
2010).   
However, this paper provided a working definition by 
drawing on the literature. In discussing decentralization, it 
was noted that the theory of decentralization seems 
appealing, but one cannot conclude which one Ghana 
utilizes as described in the ‘constitution’. Many studies 
affirm some progress in implementing decentralization 
(Ayee, 2008:255). Ghanaians are in favor of decen-
tralization as a positive method of citizen empowerment 
and local economic development, which enjoys both legal 
and constitutional guarantees with strong support from 
the citizenry.  
However, though some scholars argue that 
decentralization ensures responsibility, efficiency and 
accountability through participatory democracy, 
Ghanaians at the regional and district levels are deprived 
of these democratic principles; but the requirement for 
officeholders to be answerable is at the very root of 
representative democracy (Debrah, 2009: 286) where 
locals through the democratic process can elect their own 
leaders. Therefore, this paper advocates for a 
constitutional amendment to allow theoretical democratic 
principle to become a reality in Ghana. 
The history of decentralization and public administra-
tion in Ghana has come with criticisms as the executive 
tends to appoint party favorites (The spoils system 
concept). Such executive power, as enshrined in the 
‘constitution’, does not ensure participatory democracy 
“unless the right, interest and involvement…  [of]…the 
society at large are taken into consideration [through] 
elections” (Loh, 2008, 128).  
Allowing locals to elect their own political leaders is 
more likely to force local public officials to perform since 
failing to do so, may result in the electorates rejecting 
them in future elections. However, to extend to which 
citizens are involved in the local administration of their 
constituencies depends on the political leader or the 
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